The Chain of Failures That Left 17 Dead in a Bronx Apartment Fire (Published 2022) (2024)

By Anjali Singhvi,James Glanz,Weiyi Cai,Evan Grothjan and Mika Gröndahl

The Chain of Failures That Left 17 Dead in a Bronx Apartment Fire

A Times investigation shows how a New York City high-rise became a deadly chimney of smoke.

By Anjali Singhvi, James Glanz, Weiyi Cai, Evan Grothjan and Mika Gröndahl

July 8, 2022

Video via Citizen

The main fire safety system failed disastrously in a blaze at a Bronx apartment building in January, killing 17 people, The New York Times has found.

The deaths were preventable, experts said. No one died from the fire itself, which was largely contained in the two-story apartment where it started, Apt. 3N.

But when multiple self-closing doors did not close properly, deadly smoke escaped the apartment and rapidly filled the building’s 19 stories, according to interviews, witness videos, analysis of 911 calls and a 3-D smoke simulation. A majority of the people who died had been at least a dozen floors above the fire.
Video via Citizen

How stairwells became chimneys

Twin Parks North West, an affordable-housing building constructed in 1972, is like many older residential high-rises in New York City that have minimal or no sprinklers in place: It relies primarily on compartmentation to keep smoke from spreading in case of a fire. That means doors must automatically close and latch after someone passes through. If the doors close, the smoke is largely contained. If not, residents are at risk of severe injury or death by smoke inhalation.

At Twin Parks North West, compartmentation broke down in at least three places on Jan. 9. Not only did the door to Apt. 3N, where the fire began, stay open, so did both doors to the third-floor stairwells for lengthy periods. Doors to stairwells in at least two higher floors also malfunctioned, allowing smoke to permeate the building.

“You have a gross failure of compartmentation, because there is smoke everywhere in a few minutes,” said Jose L. Torero, a professor at University College London who has investigated major fires including at the World Trade Center on Sept. 11 and Grenfell Tower in Britain in 2017.

There is certain to be considerable debate — technical, political and legal — over who was responsible for so many doors being partially or completely open when their closure could have saved lives. Maintenance of the doors and the actions of building personnel and some tenants are likely to come under scrutiny.

Using evidence The Times obtained and a 3-D model of the building The Times created, a team led by Albert Simeoni, head of the fire protection engineering department at Worcester Polytechnic Institute in Massachusetts, created a simulation of the smoke’s path on Jan. 9. The simulation was for hallways, stairwells and the apartment where the fire started — the main conduits for smoke — but not for individual apartments in the building, where ​​information on door openings was limited.

The fire was sparked by an electric space heater in a bedroom on the lower level of Apt. 3N.

A mattress in the bedroom had caught on fire, and smoke filled the lower level of the apartment.

Smoke quickly traveled to the apartment’s upper level. Residents described hearing fire alarms sometime before 11 a.m., but they did not take them seriously, given the history of false alarms in the building. “There’s an alarm that always goes off in our building,” said Desireth Melo, a sixth-floor resident. “To us, that’s normal.”

First compartmentation failure As the Wague family fled the fire in their apartment, the door never closed properly, creating the initial opening for smoke to enter the third-floor hallway.

The door to Apt. 3N, like most doors in the building, had relied on simple mechanisms to close automatically in case of a fire: spring-loaded hinges and a latch.

Interviews with residents and complaints lodged with the city indicate that, before the fire, doors routinely malfunctioned. Still, James Yolles, a spokesman for the building’s ownership group, Bronx Park Phase III Preservation LLC, said it had “no knowledge of self-closing-door issues prior to the fire.”

As the volume of smoke intensified, the building’s complex configuration only added to the confusion and made it even more difficult for residents trying to escape.

On the third floor, for example, eight units were duplexes with lower levels on the second floor. But the building stairwells and elevators were accessible only through hallways on the third floor — the second floor did not have hallways.

Four units on the third floor were single-story apartments.

The first 911 call came at 10:54 a.m., from Apt. 3M, next door to where the fire started.

In the next four minutes, calls were made from four other apartments on the third floor, all reporting smoke. One of them came from a resident from Apt. 3N, who cried, “Fire is in the bedroom!”

Among the most tragic calls came from Apt. 3J, directly across from where the fire started. A man yells into the phone for help as children are heard screaming. The apartment had been breached by smoke, as a video later confirmed. A city official said two people from the apartment died; public records indicate both were children.

Down the hall from the fire, a resident from Apt. 3E told a 911 dispatcher that she could not see outside her apartment door.

Smoke continued to pour out of Apt. 3N and into the hallway, trapping some residents as it seeped through gaps under their apartment doors.

As soon as she opened the door, the 3E resident said, a thick wall of smoke charged toward her, and it was pitch black. She went back in and put wet towels under her door, advice dispatchers gave to many residents to block the inflow of smoke. She survived.

Second compartmentation failure By now, smoke had infiltrated the building’s two stairwells. “If you lose the apartment door, you lose the floor, but losing the stairwell door, you lose the building,” Professor Simeoni of Worcester Polytechnic said.

Housed in a single central core, Stairwell A and Stairwell B were physically separated by a wall, with access on only certain floors.

Residents said the door to Stairwell B on the third floor often malfunctioned. That morning, it remained open for long stretches of time, along with Stairwell A.

When firefighters arrived shortly before 11 a.m., they left the door to Stairwell B open and designated it as the “attack stairwell.” A standard operating procedure, the move allowed them to run a hose to put out the fire. A city official said that the door had been opened before the firefighters’ arrival and had not closed properly, simply “burping,” or swinging partially open and closed, as large amounts of smoke escaped.

Third compartmentation failure There’s evidence that the stairwell doors on higher floors malfunctioned. A city official confirmed that the doors to Stairwell B on Floors 15 and 19 appeared to be open or partially open for a majority of the fire.

Video captured by a witness that morning shows thick smoke gushing out of the 15th floor, confirming that compartmentation failed on the top floors, experts said.
Source: Video via Citizen

“That shows that everybody in the building is under threat,” Charles Jennings, an associate professor in the department of security, fire and emergency management at John Jay College of Criminal Justice, said after reviewing the video.

The Chain of Failures That Left 17 Dead in a Bronx Apartment Fire (Published 2022) (1)

Flames on the 2nd floor

Flames on the 3rd floor

Stills from videos by Citizen

A review of other video showed flames coming out of Apt. 3N’s upper level several minutes after appearing to have died down on the lower level, compounding the flow of smoke.

When the smoke rushed out of Apt. 3N, it initially pressed against the ceiling of the third-floor hallway as it spread from end to end, the simulation showed.

Within 20 minutes of the start of the fire, smoke shot up the stairwells, entering hallways on higher floors.

“It seems pretty clear that the stairwell shaft was the most likely source of smoke migration,” said Brian Meacham, a fire safety engineering consultant at Meacham Associates outside of Boston.

Paradoxically, the top floors were among the most dangerous. Of the 17 people who died, 14 had been on the 15th, 18th and 19th floors.

The hot air and combustion products of the fire — including deadly gases like carbon monoxide and hydrogen cyanide — made the stairwells and many hallways untenable. In addition to the deaths, which included eight children, more than 60 people were injured, according to the Fire Department.

Calls for help

The most direct indication of how swiftly the smoke moved through the building is also the most heartbreaking: calls to 911 from residents trapped in their apartments, struggling to breathe, some of them with children, pleading for help, guidance and information.

Within 10 minutes of the first 911 call, smoke was already reported on the 16th floor. Calls were made from more than 40 of the 120 apartments.

A number of frantic calls came from the 15th floor, where video captured smoke rushing out of two apartment windows and a stairwell door was stuck open even before the fire started.

“If I was to put my hand in front of my face, I wouldn’t have been able to see it,” Leslie Casanova of Apt. 15K told The Times.

Next door in Apt. 15J, smoke breached the apartment of a family of four, who later perished. Ms. Casanova had heard the family banging on the walls and screaming for help. Then, “one by one, the voices started silencing,” she said.

Four floors above, five residents from Apt. 19W and three people visiting Mabintou Tunkara — a 19V resident, according to public records — were among those killed. Two others from the 18th floor also died.

In the end, for those who decided to make a run for it, the only way out was through passageways that had become blinding: the stairwells.

These interlocking “scissor stairs” are legal under the New York City building code in residential buildings, but fire safety experts have criticized them.

Despite being the sole means of escape, they were not directly accessible from some floors.

“The reason why scissor stairs don’t work is you’re making the assumption that if you have access from two sides, there are two means of egress,” Professor Torero said. “It relies fully on the fact that the shaft is fully protected from smoke. In a way, you’ve created a single-point failure mode.”

An in-person inspection by Times reporters revealed narrow stairwells with little to no ventilation and no pressurization or smoke-extraction system on the roof.

Video by Yesbely Fernandez via Storyful

This video captured from a higher floor shows the inside of one of the stairwells as residents were being evacuated some time later.

Walter Williams, one of the evacuated residents, described what it was like. “I stepped on people that was passed out in the stairwell. People were already dead, laying there,” he said. All the fire victims died from smoke inhalation, but it is unclear where they were found.

“The loss of life here was totally preventable. Totally,” said Robyn Gershon, a clinical professor of epidemiology at New York University. “Anything that could go wrong, went wrong here.”

Photograph by Ryan J. Degan/New York City Department of Buildings, via Associated Press

As the city waits for the results of an official investigation, the scale of the disaster is unquestioned. “The Twin Parks fire is one of the worst in our city’s history,” said Laura Kavanagh, the acting fire commissioner, “with innocent lives taken from a deadly combination of a space-heater fire and open doors on multiple floors that allowed smoke to spread throughout the building.”

The investigation is likely to center around the self-closing doors. In interviews with The Times, Mr. Yolles, the spokesman for the building’s ownership group, and a city official said that when residents fled, the 3N door remained stuck open, possibly from an extra layer of flooring, though it’s unclear whether it was thick enough to make a difference. A lawyer representing the Wagues said there would be no comment from the family at this time.

Reliant Realty Services, the management company, said in a statement that the 3N door “was signed off as working properly” after an inspection last year, and that the Fire Department and building tenants were primarily to blame. “The third-floor doors were opened multiple times during the fire by residents and the F.D.N.Y. for firefighting operations, which caused smoke to fill the stairwells and reach the upper floors,” the company said.

The Reliant claims are difficult to square with visual evidence from security camera footage. This evidence has not been released publicly, but a city official described it to The Times. The official said the footage showed that a third-floor stairwell door never latched after a building worker opened it and that a 15th-floor stairwell door became stuck after a tenant opened it earlier.

“To be very clear, prior to F.D.N.Y. arrival at this fire, the third floor, stairwell and multiple upper floors were filled with thick, choking smoke due to multiple open doors throughout the building,” said James Long, a spokesman for the New York Fire Department. “To state that firefighters bravely working to save the lives of residents are the cause of the smoke reaching upper floors is insulting and a gross deflection of responsibility,” he said.

More modern high-rises in the city, or older ones that have been retrofitted, have numerous additional safety features, including sprinklers and fire alarms connected to “central stations,” and from there to firehouses. At Twin Parks North West, there was an alarm system, but it was not connected to fire stations, which the building’s owners confirmed.

Mr. Yolles, the spokesman for the building owners, said that, when the building was constructed, the system was consistent with the New York State code, and that the owners plan to upgrade it.

Additional protective measures provide “redundancies,” or backups in case another safety feature fails, said Jonathan Barnett, a fire safety expert who investigated the World Trade Center fires of Sept. 11 and has been a consultant on the official investigation into the 2017 Grenfell Tower fire in London. “The point is that if you’re going to rely on one system and one system only, you’d better make sure it works,” he said.

See how smoke can change your visibility.

This augmented reality experience demonstrates how quickly smoke can change visibility.

To experience this in your space, you will need the Instagram app and an iPhone 12 or 13 Pro with lidar.

To view on Instagram, open the camera on your device and point to the QR tag below.The Chain of Failures That Left 17 Dead in a Bronx Apartment Fire (Published 2022) (2)

Experience in AR

Methodology

The 3-D model of the building is based on architectural drawings from the New York City Department of Buildings. The Times reviewed design and planning documents and inspected portions of the building in person, including one of the two stairwells, after the fire.

To better understand how the catastrophe unfolded, The Times spoke with residents about what they witnessed on Jan. 9 and about the conditions on many floors of the building before and during the fire. Times reporters reviewed photos and videos taken by residents during the fire and the evacuation as well as those officials took later. The Times also examined video that witnesses captured and uploaded to Citizen, an app that allowed people nearby to document the minute-by-minute progression of the fire. Through a Freedom of Information Law request, Times reporters obtained audio logs of 911 calls made by the residents the morning of the fire. To verify which apartments the calls were made from and when they occurred, we synced the 911 calls with the dispatch report of the fire obtained by the New York Police Department.

The Times asked scientists at Worcester Polytechnic Institute in Massachusetts to conduct numerous simulations to help explain how smoke could have raced so freely through the building. The simulations were led by Albert Simeoni, professor and head of the department of fire protection engineering, and carried out by Muthu Kumaran Selvaraj, a postdoctoral researcher in the department. The simulations were created using software called Fire Dynamics Simulator, developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology and used widely by researchers and investigators to estimate the flow of smoke in structures.

Times reporting and public information from the New York Fire Department informed boundary conditions and other inputs for the simulation. These included the starting point and overall progression of the fire; the times when windows broke; and whether specific doors were open, closed or simply not functioning properly — including the opening of stairwell doors on the third, 15th and 19th floors. These inputs also included firsthand observations of the stairwells, which helped us determine, for example, that the stairwells had no pressurization or smoke-extraction systems to mitigate smoke flow. Many different scenarios were run in order to determine the influence of the opening or closing of particular doors, precisely how the fire progressed and other conditions in the building.

The simulations used ventilation calculations based on the 1964 New York State building code. Twin Parks North West was built in 1972. After consulting fire safety experts, we decided on a method to determine how long the stairwell doors were open purely for egress on each floor. We used a conservative estimate of the few seconds during which a properly functioning door would be open for each resident to be able to exit.

Where exact information on conditions inside the building were not available, some approximations were made based on reasonable estimates drawn from video observations, photographic evidence, descriptions contained in calls to 911, interviews with residents and city officials and public statements by Fire Department officials. For example, heavy smoke emanating from a few windows indicated that there was a path for smoke and air to flow from an interior hallway to the outside. Because the details of that path are not known, the simulation approximated the flow.

Sources: Jose L. Torero, University College London; Albert Simeoni, Worcester Polytechnic Institute; Muthu Kumaran Selvaraj, Worcester Polytechnic Institute; Charles Jennings, John Jay College of Criminal Justice; Philip J. Landrigan, Program for Global Public Health and the Common Good at Boston College; Robyn Gershon, New York University; Brian Meacham, Meacham Associates; Jonathan Barnett, Basic Expert; Jack J. Murphy, John Jay College of Criminal Justice; Gregory A. James, JB&B; Rainald Lohner, George Mason University; Bryan Klein, Thunderhead Engineering; New York City Department of Buildings; New York Police Department; New York Fire Department

Correction:

July 19, 2022

An earlier version of this article reversed the positions of Stairwell A and Stairwell B.

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The Chain of Failures That Left 17 Dead in a Bronx Apartment Fire (Published 2022) (2024)
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